SOC3490 Evolution of Cooperation Tournament Results

This website stores the results of the Evolution of Cooperation tournament hosted in the course SOC3490 (How do Social Structures Emerge? An Introduction to the Micro-Macro Problem) at Cornell University.

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Past Winning Strategies


Rules of the Game

The rules of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma are as follows:

  1. Each player plays against each other as well as a copy of themselves in a n_rounds = 50 move iterated prisoners dilemma
  2. The whole tournament is run n_iter = 5 times to reduce stochastic variability
  3. The payoff structure is:
    • mutual cooperation: 3 points
    • mutual defection: 1 point,
    • temptation payoff: 5 points,
    • sucker’s payoff: 0
  4. Three strategies are added by default: TITFORTAT, RANDOM, and THEPROF. If no strategy is able to win against THEPROF, TITFORTAT, or RANDOM, these strategies are iteratively excluded and the tournament rerun. (Unfortunately, no strategy was able to achieve a higher score than THEPROF so far.)


Scoreboard of Past Tournaments

Spring 2024
Spring 2025
Spring 2026